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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANITA FLIPPEN~ 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 7551 
FAY MILLWARD, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages 
for personal injuries sustained by her on the 20th day 
of November, 1949, when an automobile which she was 
operating was run into from the rear by a.n automobile 
being driven by the defendant. The jury returned a 
verdict of no cause of action. The plaintiff ap:peals upon 
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one ground, to-wit: that the court erred in giving the 
following instruction: 
"You are instructed that no person shall 
suddenly decrease S!peed of a vehicle without 
first giving an appropriate signal which would 
indicate to a driver immediately to the rear 
that said vehicle was going to decrease its 
speed; and if you find by a ·preponderance of 
the evidence that plaintiff suddenly decreased 
her speed upon said highway without giving a 
signal that could be seen and observed by a 
driver in the rear and that her failure to give 
such a signal in sufficient time to warn the 
defendant caused or contributed to the accident 
and the resulting injuries, if any, then your 
verdict shall be in favor of defendant on plain-
tiff's complaint, no cause of action" (R. 23). 
The appellant contends that said instruction was 
inapplicable because there was no evidence to support 
the giving of the instruction, and was ·prejudicial. 
A determination of this question requires a review 
of the evidence offered and received at the trial. We shall 
therefore briefly review the evidence. 
Franklin Charles Nielsen, a witness called by the 
plaintiff, testified that he was an engineer employed 
by the State Road Commission, and that the map, plain-
tiff's Exhibit "A", prepared by him, fairly represented 
the intersection of Highway 91 and Church Street 
immediately North of the -main intersection of Layton, 
Utah (R. 33). The ma1p showed High-vvay 91 to be a t\yo 
lane highway North of the intersection of Highway 91 
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and Church Street, and a four lane highway South of 
said intersection. That running along~ the West side 
of Highway 91 and parallel to the highway was a ditch, 
which ditch ran under Church Street immediately West 
of the intersection of Church Street and I-Iigh,vay 91. 
That on the ''Test side of Highway 91 and on the North 
side of Church Street where the two intersect, -is a power 
pole and that there is a second power pole approximately 
140 feet South of the first power pole shown on the 
bottom of the map (R. 38). 
Mr. Fay Millard, the defendant was then called as 
a witness by the plaintiff. He testified that on the 
morning of the collision he was operating a 1942 Ford 
Station Wagon with hydraulic four wheel brakes in 
good condition (R. 40). That he encountered a fog as 
he was operating south -along Highway 91. That he was 
driving approximately eight to fifteen miles· an hour 
as he drove south along the highway toward Layton and 
that as he approached the intersection of Church Street 
and High,vay 91 he was travelling at a speed between 
eight and twelve miles an hour (R. 41). He was asked 
the following questions and gave the following answers: 
'' Q. How close did you get to Mrs. Flippen's 
car before you saw it~ 
''A. I don't know, sir. 
"Q. Did you see the car at all before the 
collision' 
"A. That I can't say." 
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He further testified that the highway was damp but in 
good shape (R. 41). He testified that he did not know 
whether ~is brakes were applied just before or at the 
time of the collision, but that he made ari immediate 
stop at the time of the collision ( R. 42). 
L. A. Youngberg, called to testify by the plaintiff, 
testified that: That he was an officer employed by the 
Salt Lake City Police Department and had made a study 
of matters pertaining to traffic administration and the 
laws governing the stopping of automobiles. That the 
reaction time of an average person driving an automo-
bile keeping a constant lookout is three-quarters of a 
second. That one operating an automobile with four 
wheel brakes in good condition on an oiled high,vay 
tra veiling at the rate of eight miles an hour shoul~ be 
able to bring the car to a complete stop at between 10.88 
and 13.08 feet (R. 46). That travelling at twelve miles 
an hour a car should be stopped at between 17.92 and 
22.83 feet (R. 47). • 
The plaintiff, Anita Flippen, then testified: That 
she resides at Clearfield, Utah, is thirty seven years of 
age and has operated an automobile between sixteen 
and twenty years. That on the morning of November 
20th, she left her home which is approximately four 
miles North of Layton, sometime before eight o'clock. 
That she drove a Hudson Pickup truck which her hus-
band had had three or four years. That when she left 
her home the atmosphere was clear and bright (R. 52). 
That as she reached approximately the Naval Base Road 
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within a mile South of her hon1e, she ran into a fog 
and immediately turned on the bright lights of the auto-
mobile. That prior to encountering the fog she had been 
operating the auto1nobile at twenty miles an hour and 
then cut the speed to about ten miles an hour. That the 
fog \Yas hea,~~ and that \Yith lights on she could see 
dow·n the hig-h,vay approxin1ately forty to fifty feet 
(R. 53). That there is a church to the right of High,vay 
91 on Church Street known as Rose of Saint Lima and 
that she was on her \Yay to attend eight o'clock mass 
(R. 54). That as she approached the intersection of 
Church Street and Highway 91 she w.as travelling be-
tween eight and ten miles ·an h·our and had slowed up 
for the corner which she kne\v she vvas approaching 
(R. 54). That she had traversed that road leaving High-
\Yay 91 and going over on Church Street ·practically 
eYery Sunday and a fevv days in between for a nu1nber 
of years (R. 55). That the collision occurred south of 
the po,ver pole at the Northwest corner of the intersec-
tion of Highway 91 and Church Street (R. 53). That the 
point of collision was indicated by her on the map, Exhib-
it "A" at a !point marked "f". That at the time of the 
collision her automobile was facing in a Southwesterly 
direction and that she had just started to make the 
turn and had turned the wheel partially (R. 56). The 
following questions were asked and the following 
answers given : 
"Q. State whether or not prior to that time 
you had given any signal of turning. 
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''A. I looked in my reflecting mirror and 
I had partially lowered the left front window 
and raised my h·and as a signal. 
'' Q. Was your hand still raised as a signal 
at the time of the impact~ 
''A. I had just drawn it back in to .put 
back on the steering wheel.'' 
She testified that immediately on the impact she was 
thrown back into the window and then over the steering 
wheel into the windshield. That she was temporarily 
dazed or stunned and when she ''came to'' she felt the 
motion of the car and on looking out of the car could 
see an outline of buildings across the street. That she 
applied her brakes and steered over to the side of the 
road to get off of the road (R. 56, 57). That she brought 
the car to a stop and immediately turned off the igni-
tion and the lights (R. 56). That when the car was 
brought to a stop it was at approximately the south 
power pole shown on the map at 140 feet South of the 
North :power pole where the collision occurred (R. 57). 
That she was travelling approximately eight miles an 
· hour at the time of impact. That at the time of impact 
she had on the bright lights of the automobile. That the 
impact broke the tail light of the automobile (R. 57). 
That the tail light was in good condition before the 
impact (R. 57). That the impact injured her left shoulder 
and she had to open the door with her right hand and 
was in the act of getting out of the car when another 
car drove up from the side (R. 57). That it was some-
one else, not the defendant. That she got ·out of the car 
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and \Yas offered assistance by a young man 'vho1n she 
believes 'vas ~Ir. Buckley \Yhom she had never met before 
(R. 58). That she then walked toward the end of the 
truck and at that ti1ne the defendant \Yas approaching 
and she \Yaited for him to con1e up and had a brief 
conYersa.tion \Yith hi1n in which she said: ''My gosh, guy, 
what happened~''; he said: '' I didn't see you until I 
was upon you". That there was nothing else said that 
she remembered. That she was then- assisted to the 
rectory. That she suffered a broken shoulder blade in 
the left shoulder, broken ribs and numerous and serious 
bruises ( R. 59). That as a result of the shock she suf-
fered severe pain and was required to take sedatives . 
to quiet her nerves and at the time of the trial was still 
using sedatives. That she was suffering from a nervous 
disorder \Yhich was a result of the death of her child 
in an accident some three of f·our years before (R .. 61). 
That immediately prior to the collision she could see 
to the right of the automobile toward the ditch and 
culvert she was about to cross and could distinguish 
the ditch (R. 63). That the automobile had a rear vision 
side mirror and \Vhen she looked into the mirror she saw' 
no car approaching. That she looked into the mirror 
a point four or five lengths of the car north of the point 
of impact (R. 65) and after she had looked she gave 
the signal. That she was aware of the fact that she was 
approaching the intersection some distance back of 
the intersection (R. 65, 66). That she could see forty 
to fifty feet ahead on the highway. That she was driv-
ing to the right of the center or yellow line and she could 
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see the yellow line (R. 66). That the left wheel \Vas 
approximately five or six feet west of the center line. 
That she had turned to the right as she approached 
the corner in order to get off the road to make the turn 
(R. 67). That she had slightly turned the wheel and the 
front of her car had turned slightly so that the car was 
actually on an angle at the time of the impact (R. 67). 
That she stopped her car by the south power pole. That 
she guided it off the highway at the pole and at the 
time applied her brakes immediately before stopping 
(R. '68). That the car was completely off the highway 
when stopped (R. 69). That · vvithout lights one 
could see in the fog twenty five to thirty feet (R. 70, 71). 
That at no time did she see a car in £ron t of her but 
some cars ·passed her in the opposite direction (R. 71). 
That the road was dry. That there was moisture on 
the window shield and she had had her window shield 
wipers working (R. 7?). That she turned off her light~ 
and ignition as soon as she stopped the car (R. 73). 
That at the time of the impact she V\ras going about eight 
miles .an hour and the motor was still running and the 
car was in second gear (R. 74). That she had put the 
ear in second gear when she slowed up just as she ·was 
going to turn. That at the time she gave the signal 
she put in the clutch so that she could shift gears -and 
that she did shift her gears but did not put on her 
brake (R. 74). That she put her ·car in second gear so 
that she would not miss the road over the ditch. That she 
could see the ditch and the road over the ditch twenty 
five to thirty feet ·off to the west. That she could see 
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the road very plainly. That if she had turned sharp 
enough she could have missed the bridge and hit the 
ditch (R. 75). That there 'vas no reason to think that 
she 'Yas going to hit the ditch but that she took the 
precaution to shift the gear but did not put on her 
brake (R. 76). That the doctor did not put her arm in a 
cast but did put it in a sling which she used for between 
t\vo and three months. That she was in bed a ,,~eek or ten 
days (R. 77). 
LeRoy Rex Flippen was then called by the !plaintiff. 
He testified that he 'vas the husband of the plaintiff, 
resided at Clearfield, Utah, and owned his own electrical 
business ( R. 78). That in his business he used the 1946 
Hudson Pickup truck involved in the collision. That 
the tail light of the automobile was w·orking the night 
before the collision. That in the collision the light -vvas 
badly damaged and was broken. That he repaired the 
taillight and re·placed the lamp after the collision. That 
prior to the collision the glass in the left door wa.s in 
good condition but that it had been badly broken in the 
collision (R. 79, 80). That the tail light was built into 
a heavy steel construction (R. 81). That it was embedded 
in the steel member. That the light and glass were broken 
in the impact. That the steel frame in which the light 
was imbedded was bent in the collision (R. 82). That when 
he arrived at the scene of the collision his automobile 
was near the power pole in the south end of the map. 
That when he arrived at the scene ·of the -collision he 
looked up the road from his automobile and saw the 
defendant's automobile with his spare tire embedded 
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In the radiator grill of the defendant's car (R. 84). 
That he did not see the tail light of his automobile in 
operation the morning of the collision (R. 84). That 
the last time he had seen it was the night before about 
nine o'clock. That he had looked at it at that time when 
he purchased gas. That there was a globe in the taillight 
after the accident but it would not burn. That the re-
flecto·r glass was broken, lost out and scattered over 
the road. That after the accident he !put a piece of red 
plastic in the tail light (R. 85). That the truck was 
approximately five feet wide. That it appeared that 
the center of the im~pact took place seventeen inches 
from the left side of the truck and thirty four inches 
. from the right side (R. 86). 
It was then stipulated by counsel for both parties 
that two statements of Dr. Joseph B. Tanner might be 
read to the jury, and that if he were present he might 
testify according to the statements. That such state-
ments were substantially the s.ame. The second one, 
\Yritten on May 17th, 1950, stated that he had attended 
the plaintiff following an automobile a_ccident on N ovem-
ber 20th, 1949. That her injuries consisted of moderate 
shock and multiple bruises, especially up the entire 
left body from the foot to the head, a sprained left 
shoulder and fracture ·of the left shoulder blade without 
dis;placement. That at the time she had a temporary 
paralysis of the muscles of the left shoulder. That the 
bruises. healed rapidly so that in four weeks time her 
main complaint was nervous reaction and pain in the 
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left shoulder area. That the fracture healed without 
marked complications. That at the time of the state-
ment she 'Yas completely recovered physically although 
she still complained of aches and pains in the left 
shoulder follo,Ying' strenuous "'"ork and activity an<l 
that she had recently had s'velling of the left shoulder 
follo,ving heaYier use of the arm. That there was no 
limitation of motion or evidence of weakness :present. 
That she had an unusual degree of nervous shock which 
may be partially explained by the fact that she lost 
a son in an automobile acciderit about three years before 
and had never recovered her composure since. That hi~ 
prognosis was that he expected no serious complications 
or after effects to develop·, but she evidently had a 
minor residual traumatic neurosis and· fibrositis which 
may gradually disappear or which may remain and 
even become more severe and disabling (R. 89, 90). 
Thereupon the plaintiff rested. 
Mr. Ross Everett vVilliams was then called by the 
defendant and testified. He testified that he was a 
resident of Kaysville, Utah, and operator of a cafe. 
That he knew the defendant but had not known him 
prior to the day of the collision. That with his son in 
lavv he vvas on the way from Sahara Village to Salt Lake 
City. That they had followed Mr. Millward's car some 
distance before the collision, travelling between fifteen 
and seventeen miles an hour. That when they followed 
the defendant at a distance greater than twenty five 
to thirty feet he could not see the defendant's taillight, 
and that he saw no red light in front of the defendant'R 
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car (R. 91). That one could see a tail light in the fog 
between twenty five and thirty feet but could not see 
that far without a light (R. 92). That at the time of the 
collision they were travelling behind the defendant and 
heard the collision, and that they thereup·on stopped 
their automobile. That they drove around in front 
of the defendant and in front of the plaintiff (R. 92). 
That the collision occurred about where the plaintiff 
had placed the point of collision and that her car was 
setting about in the middle of the intersection and that 
they had to push the truck off the road. That it was 
parked over against the curb (R. 93). That after the 
collision the plaintiff's truck was squarely in front 
of the defendant's car down the highway about ten 
or twelve feet (R. 94). That Mr. Buckley heLped the 
plaintiff to the church and he helped the defendant 
to the Signal Cafe and called the law and a doctor 
(R. 94). That a man from Ols.en's garage helped him 
and Mr. Buckley push the cars off the highway. On 
cross examination he testified that Mrs. Flippen's car 
. was stopped right in the middle of the road that turns 
over to the church and that when ~he car was pushed 
off the highway it was left immediately south of the 
stop sign on the south side of Church Street at the inter-
section (R. 96). Williams was handed a statement to 
read which he had previously made wherein he had 
stated: 
"when her car. was hit it was knocked past 
the road that turns off to the little Catholic 
church''; 
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He stated that he had not meant that (R. 96). That at 
the time he made the statement he thought it was right 
but that it "\Vas a long tin1e to remember. That he was 
sure that it '""as not clear past the road. 
Floyd Dean Buckley was then ealled by the defend-
and and testified. He said that he was a resident of 
Sahara Village and was a son in law of Mr. Williams. 
That he had not met the defendant prior to the accident. 
That on the morning of November 20th he was on his 
way to Salt Lake City and had followed the defendant 
from Sahara Village (R. 98). That the fog was pretty 
heavy and thick. That he followed the defendant's car 
at ~a distance of ap:proximately twenty five feet at a 
speed of bet,veen fifteen -and eighteen miles an hour 
(R. 99). That at the intersection of the road that turns 
off to the Catholic church, he heard the collision and 
pulled around the defendant's car. That after the col-
lision the plaintiff's car w:as twelve to fourteen fe.et 
in front of the defendant's. That the defendant's car 
was directly behind the plaintiff's car (R. 101). That 
he had nothing to do with moving the cars after the 
accident (R. 102). That after he returned from the 
church the plaintiff's ear was on the shoulder of the 
highway just past the turn going to the church (R. 102). 
That one could see in the fog without any lights, 
possible thirty feet (R. 102, 103). That when he followed 
the defendant's car down to the highway prior to the 
accident he could see the tail light but did not see any 
taillight in front of the defendant's car (R. 103). 
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George E. Briggs was called by the defendant and 
testified. He stated that he was the Town M·arshal of 
Layton, Utah. That about eight o'clock or· 8:10 he 
received a call and went to the scene of the accident. That 
it was very foggy. That one could see twenty five to 
thirty feet ahead (R. 104). That he issued no cit·ation 
(R. 105). That when he arrived the defendant's auto-
mobile was on the east side of the road (R. 106). That 
the 1Jlain tiff's automobile was :at the power pole sixty 
or seventy feet south of the intersection (R. 107). That 
the automobile was fifty or seventy five feet south of the 
south boundary of Church Street (R. 108). 
The defendant then testified as follows: That on the 
morning of the accident he was operating his father's 
automobile, going to Salt Lake City from Sahara Village 
(R. 109). That after he got to Highway 91 he had on 
his dim lights (R. 110). That as he approached Layton 
he was driving approximately fifteen miles an hour 
and then slowed down to between eight and ten miles 
an hour ( R. 111). That thereafter he ran in to the Flip-
pen automobile at the intersection of Church Street 
(R. 111). The following questions were then asked and 
the following questions given : 
'' Q. Did you see any tail light as you came 
upon the highway~ 
"A. N . o, sir. 
"Q. On any car at all~ 
"A. N . o, sir. 
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'' Q. Did you see any car 1n front of you~ 
"A. N . o, s1r. 
"Q. You don't know just 'vhen you did 
first observe the Flippen ear'? 
'' ..._:\.. No, sir, I don't'' 
That after the impact he walked over to the Flippen 
vehicle which was twelve or fifteen feet straight ~ahead 
of his car on the highway. That just before the impact 
he was looking straight ahead. That there was no one 
in the car with him and his window shield was clear 
(R. 112). That he had a conversation with the plaintiff. 
The following question was asked and the following 
answer g1ven : 
'' Q. ''That was · that conversation·~ 
''A. I remember asking her why there was 
no light, why no tail light at that time; and 
if I remember right, she said something about 
the-_ not being able to see with her lights on.'' 
That he had tried to drive with his bright lights on 
that bright lights hindered him bee.ause they had a 
tendency to throw a glare back and seemed to shorten 
the line of vision. That he could see fifteen to twenty 
five feet ahead ""'ith dim lights on. He was asked if he 
had any further conversation with Mrs. Flippen to 
which he answered that he did not believe .so. He further 
testified that when the two cars met it was a solid 
blow, and that in the collision his knees hit the dash 
board and broke the control off. That after his con-
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versation with the plaintiff he and Mr. Williams walked 
to the Signal Cafe ·and called Mr. Briggs 1and Dr. 
Tanner (R. 113). That he could see cars approaching 
with lights on fifty to sixty feet. He did not kno·w 
whether they were dim lights or not. There was one 
car behind him as he proceeded down the highway. That 
that ear pulled up behind him at the stop sign as he was 
about to enter Highway 91 and he could see lights 
from then on to the point of impact and that if he looked 
in his rear mirror he could see lights. That Exhibit 1 
is a fair picture of his automobile after the accident 
( R. 114). It was stipulated that the reasonable cost 
to repair the defendant's automobile was $250.00. The 
defendant further testified that he had a conversation 
with Mr. Flippen about two weeks after the accident 
at which Mr. Flippen stated that possibly the tail light 
did not work. That he did not move his car or the 
Flipp·en's car ·after the accident (R. 115). On cross 
examination the defendant stated that at the time his 
deposition was taken he testified that no damage was 
done at all to the tail light of the !plaintiff's automo-
bi~e. Thereupon the defense rested. 
Mrs. Flippen was then recalled to the stand and 
stated that after the collision of the two automobiles 
she did not have a conversation with the defendant in 
which she said that she did not have the tail light on 
or that the head lights would hinder driving (R. 118). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
LeRoy Flippen was then recalled -and testified that 
he had a conversation with Mr. Millward some time 
after the accident in " .. hich they discussed the stop 
light and not the tail light of his automobile. That 
he had had a little trouble 'vith the switch on the brake 
light which turns the light on for a stop signal when 
the brake is applied, but that that is different than the 
tail lig~t and has nothing to do with the tail light. He 
further testified that he observed that the tail light 
wras "~orking on Saturday night about nine o'clock and 
that nothing occurred between that time and eight o'clock 
the next morning \vhich would lead him to believe that the 
tail light \Yas not working (R. 119). On cross examina-
tion he stated that he had a conversation with Mr. 
l\fillward after the accident some days later regarding 
the taillight (R. 120). Thereup.on both sides rested. 
Before th~ Court instructed the· jury, one of the 
jurors, Mr. Hendricks, visited the Judge and told him 
that he was disturbed about the evidence given by the 
plaintiff that she had given the signal without lower-
ing the window of her automobile all the way, stat-
ing that he could not give such a signal without lower-
ing the window of his automobile all the way. 
The Court then in chambers discuss·ed with counsel 
the proposed instructions to the jury, one of which 
"\vas Instruction No. 7 to the effect that no verson shall 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
stop or suddenly decrease speed of a vehicle without 
giving an appropriate signal. The Court agreed that 
there was no evidence to support the instruction. Coun-
sel for the defendant stated that he had been told by 
the defendant certain matters which would support 
the instruction and asked leave to reopen and put 
the witness back on the stand. The Court then reopened 
the case and the defendant was again 'placed on the 
stand. He testified that he had discuss·ed certain matters 
with the plaintiff concerning the tail light and when 
asked if he had had any further conversation he said 
''No''.- He was asked if he had had any further conversa-
tion with her about her position on the highway to which 
he answered "No". Mr. Richards then stated to the 
Court that he was mistaken and withdrew the witness 
from the stand (R. 122). 
Mr. Fl1ppen was then recalled by the plaintiff. He 
testified that one could give a signal while operating 
his automobile without putting the gla-ss in the windo'v 
of the door all the way down (R. 123, 124). 
Before the Court instructed the jury counsel again 
called the attention of the Court to the fact that there 
was no evidence in the record that the plaintiff s~opped 
or suddenly decreased the speed of her automobile 
before the collision. The Court then struck from Instruc-
tion No. 7 the words "stop or" but gave the instruction 
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heretofore set forth concerning suddenly decreasing 
the speed of her car. 
The plaintiff duly excepted to the giving of In-
struction No. 7 on the ground that there was no evidence 
in the case of any sudden decrease of S'peed ( R. 125, 126). 
The Court instructed_ the jury that driving into a 
vehicle on· the high,vay before you see it is negligence 
as a matter of la'v and that in this case the defend-
ant was guilty of negligence which would preclude his 
recovering on his counter claim and would entitle the 
plaintiff to recover her damages against him unless 
the plaintiff "\Yas guilty of negligence herself, which 
was a proximate cause of her injuries (R. 20, 21). The 
Court further instructed that vlaintiff might be found 
to have been contributorily negligent on one of two 
grounds: That plaintiff suddenly decreased her speed 
'vithout giving a warning or that she failed to have 
lighted the tail light of her automobile (Instructions 
7 and 8, R. 23) . 
The jury returned a verdict, no cause of action. 
The plaintiff made a motion for a new trial which 
'vas argued to the Court. The Court admitted that there 
was no evidence to support the giving of Instruction 
No. 7 but stated that he felt that the instruction was 
not prejudicial. However, the Court stated that the 
verdict of the jury was not in accordance with his feel-
ings in the matter and had he been trying the case with-
out a jury would have given a judgment, for the plain-
tiff. 
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The plaintiff and appellant relies upon the fol-
lowing points for reversal of the verdict and judgment 
appealed from. 
POINT ONE 
The Court erred in giving instruction No. 7 which 
as given reads: 
''You are instructed that no person shall 
suddenly decrease speed of a vehicle without 
first giving an ar>·propriate signal which would 
indicate to a driver immediately to ·the rear 
that such vehicle was going to decrease its 
speed; and if you find a preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiff suddenly decreased 
her speed upon said highway without giving a 
signal that could be seen and observed by a 
driver in the rear and that her failure to give 
such signal in sufficient time to warn defend-
ant caused or contributed to the ·accident and 
the resulting injuries, if any, then your ver-
dict shall be in favor of defendant on plaintiff's 
com:plaint, no cause of action", 
for the reason that there is no evidence that the [)lain-
tiff suddenly decreased the speed of her automobile 
and that said instruction was prejudicial to the plaintiff. 
POINT TWO 
That the Court erred in refusing to grant plain-
tiff's motion for 'a new trail for the reason set forth 
in Point One. 
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, . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION No. 7 AND 
THAT THE GIVING OF SUCH INSTRUCTION WAS 
PREJUDICIAL TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
The eYidence as revievved establishes that there 
was no evidence of any sudden slowing down of the 
plaintiff's automobile. The trial judge on the motion 
for a ne\\- trial admitted that fact. 
The giving of an inapplicable instruction is error. 
\-Vhen is it prejudicial error~ It is conceded that it 
is not error to give an erroneous instruction if an 
examination of all the evidence establishes that the 
one complaining of the error would not be entitled 
to prevail in any event, Jacobs v. Jacobs, 299 N.Y.S. 
187. The general rule concerning the giving of an 
inapplicable instruction is stated in 52 Am. Jur., page 
453, Sec. 579, as follows: 
''An instruction not based on the evidence 
is erroneous in that it introduces before the 
jury facts not presented thereby and is well 
calculated to induce them to suppose that such 
state of facts in the opinion of the court is 
possible under the evidence and may be con-
sidered by them. '' 
The court in Jessup v. Davis, 155 Neb. 1, 211 
N.\V. 190, stated the rule to be that instructions to a 
' 
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jury that are ina-pplicable to the proved facts and 
which are calculated to and probably do mislead the 
jury will ordinarily constitute reversible error. 
In ruling on instructions given and refused in the 
case of Hunter v. Michaelis, 198 Pac. (2d) 245, the 
Court said: 
"We conclude that the giving of the dis-
cussed instructions and the failure to give de-
fendant's request No. 6 would in all likelihood 
mislead the jury and hence constitutes prejudi-
cial error. '' 
The decisions of this Court have been n~arly 
uniform in holding that the giving of an instruction 
upon an alleged act of negligence upon which there 
is no. evidence would be presumed to be prejudicial 
error. In two separate cases Justice Elias Hansen 
ruled on this matter. In Kendall v. Fordham, 9 Pac. 
(2d) 183, h_e stated: 
''The law is well settled in this jurisdiction, 
as well as elsewhere, that it is reversible error 
for a court to submit a charged act of negli-
gence to a jury for its consideration and de-
termination in the absence of evidence tending 
to show the existence of the negligence com-
plained of. Fowkes v. J. I. Case Threshing 
Machine Company, 46 Utah 502, 151 Pac. 53. 
There is no evidence in this case which tends 
to show what started the fire in the defendant's 
·automobile and therefore the court was in error 
in ~permitting the jury to speculate as to its 
origin.'' 
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In a subsequent case, W ood~vard v ... Spring Canyon 
Coal Co1npany, 63 Pac. (2d) 267, 90 Utah 578, he stated: 
''It is a settled la'v in this jurisdiction that 
negligence must be both charged and proved. 
A failure of either is fatal. Here there was a 
failure of both. It is equally well established 
that it is prejudicial error to permit the jury 
to find ·a verdict bas-ed upon either negligence 
not charged or negligence charged but not 
shown. Davis v. Midvale City, 56 Utah 1, 189 
P. 74; Verde v. Helper State Bank, 57 Utah 
502, 196 P. 225, 15 A.L.R. '641; Smith v. San 
Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 35 Utah 390, 100 P. 
673; Machy v. Bingham New Haven Copper & 
Gold ~fining Co., 54 Utah 171, 180 P. 416; Mar-
tindale v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 48 Utah 
464, 160 P. 275; Kendall v. Fordham, 79 Utah 
256, 9 Pac. (2d) 183; Industrial Commission v. 
Wasatch Grading Co., 80 Utah 223, 14 Pac. (2d) 
988. '' 
The appellant is aware that there has been a 
change in the policy of the court as to the prejudicial 
effect of an instruction not supported by the evidence. 
As Justice Wolfe in a dissenting op1n1on in Clawson 
v. Walgreen Drug Company, 162 Pac. (2d) 759, 108 
Utah 577, stated: 
''I note a change in policy in this ·court in 
regard to determining whether inapplicable in-
structions are prejudicial. In earlier days this 
court held that an inapplicable instruction would 
be presumed to be prejudicial unless it clearly 
a·ppeared that it could not have been so. (Citing 
four cases). Of late and in this case we have 
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held that an instruction inapplicable to any 
evidence will be presumed to have been ignored 
by the jury. This means that we will assume 
that the lay jury exercises more discrimination 
than the judge. Certainly I am not one to hold 
that the mere giving of abstract instructions 
not applicable to any evidence necessarily con-
stitutes iprejudicial error. Trial judges under 
the pressure put upon them by jury trials give 
instructions at the time thought to be applic-
able, which we, in a careful survey of the whole 
case may find inapplicable. Unless there is 
good reason for supposing that the jury might 
have been misled by such instructions, there 
should not be held to be ·prejudicial error even 
'though Sec. 104-24-4 ( 4) U.C.A. 1943 states 
that: 'the court shall instruct the jury in writ-
ing upon the law applicable to the case' ". 
A consideration of the evidence in that case, Claw-
son v. Walgreen Drug -company, and the op:posite con-
clusions reached, furnishes a basis for determining 
when an inapplicable instruction is erroneous. In that 
case the plaintiff was injured when he walke'd into 
iron trap doors which covered an opening in the side 
walk immediately adjoining the defendant's building 
at the corner -of 25th Street and Washington Avenue 
in Ogden. The doors were immediately south of the 
south front of the store and open so that when each 
half was up the doors ran north and south. The 
evidence was conclusive, without any dispute, that the 
plaintiff walked into the east of the two doors fror11 
the east and that he could not possibly have walked 
into the hole created in the side walk by opening the 
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doors by walking into the hole from the south. How-
ever, the Court gave an instruction that if the jury 
found that by reason of the absence of any fence or 
barrier or other protection on the south side of the 
trap door the side \valk was not reasonably safe it 
could find the defendant guilty of negligence. The 
defendant contended that the giving of that instruc-
tion "~as prejudicial error. The majority of the Court, 
s:peaking through Justice \v ... ade, held that since there 
was no dispute in the evidence as to the manner in 
which the accident occurred the giving of the instruc-
tion could not be prejudicial error. The Court stated: 
''One other instruction should be noted : In 
defining the defendant's duty the jury -vvas told 
that the defendant was required to make the 
opening in the side walk reasonably safe for 
customary traffic on the public street and that 
if the jury found that by reason of the absence 
of any fence or barrier or other protection on 
the south side of the trap doors the side walk 
was not reasonably safe it could find the de-
fendant guilty of negligence. As already noted 
there has been no evidence that the failure to 
have a fence or barrier on the south side of 
the door in any way contributed to the injury. 
The plaintiff, according to his own testimony, 
did_ not fall into the hole. He bumped into one 
door and apparently knocked it closed and fell 
upon the edge of the other door. Witness 
Southam also so testified. The failure to have 
a barrier on the south side could have made no 
difference. The court therefore erred in giving 
such instruction, but in view of the conclusive-
ness of the evidence that the plaintiff fell over 
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the door and did not step into the hole to the 
south between the doors, the jury could not 
have been misled by this instruction wnd there-
fore the error was not p,rejudicial. '' 
The reasoning of the court that the jury could 
not be misled because of the conclusiveness of the 
evidence as to the cause of the accident, is the im-
portant part of that ruling. 
In the case at bar, the opposite situation· presents 
itself. Bearing in mind that the court instructed the 
jury that the conduct of the defendant was negligent 
as a matter of law, the only question remaining was 
whether or not the -plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent. The question of contributory negligence was sub-
mitted to the jury on two grounds: One, by Instruc-
tion No. 8 regarding the plaintiff driving without a 
tail light and the other by the instruction under at-
tack regarding_ suddenly slowing down. If in the case 
at bar the evidence was uncontradicted that the plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent because she was oper-
ating her automobile without a tail light, the court 
might well rule as the majority did in Cla~vson v. W al-
green _Drug Company, that the error was harmless and 
the jury could not have been misled, but such· was 
not the case. There was a distinct conflict of the evi-
dence as to that matter. The plaintiff testified that 
she turned the lights of her automobile on as soon 
as she ran into the fog (R. 53), and that after she 
brought her car to a stop off the highway after the 
collision she turned off the lights and turned off the 
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ignition (R. 56). She further testified that the tail 
light of her automobile was broken in the collision 
(R. 57). The :plaintiff's husband testified that the 
tail light of the automobile was in good condition at 
nine o'clock on the night before the collision and that 
nothing hap·p.ened in the time intervening between 
then and the time of the collision which might lead 
him to think that the tail light \Yas not in operating 
condition (R. 119). The defendant testified that the 
plaintiff stated that she had turned off her lights 
because the lights interferred with her driving in the 
fog ( R. 113), but this the plain tiff denied ( R. 118) . 
The defendant testified that he had a conversation 
''Tith the husband of the plaintiff subsequent to the 
accident concerning the condition of the tail light (R. 
115), and the plaintiff's husband testified concerning 
the conversation disputing the statement of the de-
fendant (R. 119). Thus it appears that the evidence 
concerning the matter of the plaintiff operating her 
automobile without a tail light was in serious dispute. 
Under such state of the evidence it may fairly be 
said that the instruction directing the attention of 
the jury to the matter of sudden stopping in all likeli-
hood confused and misled the jury. In connection with 
such a situation, I cite again from the dissenting opin-
ion of Justice Wolfe in Clawson v .. Walgreen Drug 
Company, above: 
"The instruction- that if the jury found by 
reason of the absence of any fence or barrier 
or other protection on the south side of the 
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trap door the side walk was not reasonably 
safe, it could find the defendant guilty of negli-
gence, was prejudicial error. Absence of a fence 
or barrier on the south side of the door did 
not contribute to the injury. Hitherto in this 
opinion for purposes more apparent now, I 
took occasion to call attention to the fact that 
we have become more liberal than formerly in 
determining whether nona pplicable instructions 
were prejudicial, a policy with which I am in 
accord. Our inquiry should be as to_ whether 
there was a good reason to think that a non-
applicable instruction was likely to mislead or 
confuse jurymen-reasonable and conscientious 
jurymen-as to draw into the vortex of their 
deliberations the assumpt"ion that the subject 
matter of the instruction was materially in-
volved in the case. And vve cannot ascribe to 
the jurymen in this inquiry the experience of 
astute lawyers or jurists. If the ordinary mind 
might be likely to conclude that something was 
a material element in the ease because of an 
instruction whereas it was not and because of 
that conclusion there 'vas a good likelihood that 
the verdict was substantially influenced or af-
fected thereby to the detriment of the appel-
la.n t, such erroneous instruction should be held 
as ~prejudicial * * .;!; 
' 'The mind of the jury would be pointedly 
directed to the fact that the judge considered 
there was evidence from which it could he 
concluded that the plaintiff had fallen into the 
vault because of lack of protection from the 
south side. The instruction was actually calcu-
lated to do that. Yet the accident definitely 
was caused by the plaintiff not falling into the 
hole but actually walking against the raised 
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barrier, falling over it-an act in itself strongly 
indicative of lack of care for his own protec-
tion. To divert the mind of the jury from a 
chain of circumstances which culminated in the 
accident to a false chain on which could be 
predicated a conclusion of different and perhaps 
greater culpability on the part of the defendant 
'vhen both true and ~false chains themselves 
"\vere so closely connected that the same physical 
object and the manner in which the accident 
happened may, with great likelihood, have influ-
enced the jury to base a conclusion on the sup-
posed more culpable delict.'' 
One cannot assume that the jury disregarded the 
instruction concerning the giving of a signal and 
sudden slowing, particularly in view of the fact that 
the juryman Hendricks expressed to the court his 
concern about the ability of the ~palintiff to give a 
signal by raising her arm -out of the window without 
lowering the window all the vvay (R. 121), and to 
meet this problem the plaintiff introduced additional 
evidence (R. 123, 124). 
The inapplicable instruction was further confus-
ing in that the court instructed that the plaintiff would 
be guilty of contributory negligence if she suddenly 
decreased the speed of her automobile without first 
giving an appropriate signal which would indicate to 
a driver immediately to the rear that she going to 
decrease her speed. The defendant admitted that he 
ran into the plaintiff's automobile without even seeing 
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the automobile. What kind of a signal could the 
·plaintiff give which would be seen by the defendant~ 
The Sup·reme Court of Oklahoma had before it in 
a very recent case, Kelly v. Employers Casualty Co ... 
et. al., 214 Pac. (2d) at 925, a case very similar to 
the case at bar. In that case the plaintiff in driving 
to Oklahoma City from her home approached a bridge 
across the river west of the city. She saw another 
car approaching the bridge from the east end and 
knowing that the two cars would meet on the bridge 
she decreased the speed of her car from approximately 
thirty-five miles an hour to twenty-five miles an hour 
and ~fter meeting and passing the approaching car on 
the bridge she was rendered unconscious. The defend-
ant pleaded that the collision of his automobile and 
plaintiff's automobile was an unavoidable accident be-
cause of the slowing down of the plaintiff's car im-
mediately before the collision and that the plaintiff 
vYas contributorily negligent because she failed to 
give a proper warning to those following her of her 
intention to decrease the speed of her car. Upon 
the trial, the defendant offered no evidence. The 
plaintiff, having been rendered unconscious could testify 
to no more facts than those heretofore stated except 
that her car was struck from the rear by something. 
The court instructed the jury that they might find in. 
favor of the defendant if they found the accident to 
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be unavoidable or if the plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of 
the defendant. The plaintiff appealed and assigned as 
error among other errors the giving of instructions 
upon contributory negligence when there was no evi~ 
dence to support the giving of such instructions. 
The Court in rendering its decision stated: 
''That 'plaintiff sustained injuries and that 
she - has expended large sums of money for 
medical and hospital services and that she has 
not yet recovered from the effects of her in-
juries, are not disputed facts in this case. 
\\Tith the evidence of these results following 
the demolishing of her car. in the collision, we 
are constrained to hold that the instruction of 
the court here, complained of and which we 
believe to be erroneous, misled the jury to the 
prejudice of the plaintiff's rights and that she 
should be granted a new trial of the action.'' 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The plaintiff, upon her motion for a new trial, 
argued only that the giving of Instruction No. 7 was 
in error. This the court admitted and admitted that the 
decision was contrary to what he would have ruled had 
he been sitting without a jury, but that the instruction 
\ras not prejudicial. 
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In view of the matters heretofore discussed the 
court erred In not granting plaintiff's motion for a 
new trial. 
For reasons hereinbefore pointed out, it is sub-
mitted that the ·judgment appealed from should be 
reversed and the appellant awarded her costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. GRANT IVERSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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